Divert.

June 5, 2010

State of Emergency has moved to http://gauchesinister.wordpress.com/

 

On fuckability.

March 11, 2010

Revisiting my last post: Of course, the most obvious response is sexual refusal. And while those who have no other power exaggerate the value of their fuckability just as much as those who want to fuck them may feign powerlessness, the power of sexual refusal is grossly overestimated.1 I am so frustrated by young women who confuse femininity with fuckability, and fuckability with power — the exchange value is not so high as you might imagine, and the market is flooded.

But apart from it being a predictable strategy for any femme, I think it’s damaging and wasteful to withhold something you want, in order to punish someone else. Punishment may bring its own satisfaction, but it’s ineffective for the change I’m seeking, and I think you know how I feel about self-denial. But what compels change? Merely addressing something doesn’t alter it, and "calling out", from what I’ve experienced even in relatively supportive communities, can be arduous, traumatic and futile.

1. I agree with Max Attitude that "someone always likes someone else more", and in some situations that means the latter has a lot of power over the former — I think in other situations the latter is much more replaceable than either party might realise. Sometimes the power dynamic in a relationship is an exact inversion of each partner’s power in the wider world, and it’s their relative positions in the rest of society that enable the temporary and limited inversion in their relationship. For example, I think this is true for most cases of the "hen-pecked" husband or "pussy-whipped" boyfriend (it’d amuse me to analyse the difference, but it’s an unnecessary diversion) — and in the remainder of cases, probably the majority, the woman doesn’t even have more power in the relationship. In more casual encounters where the transaction is simpler, I think both the value of fuckability and the interchangeability of fuckable bodies is more evident.


Meta: I’ve posted a bunch of writings that I’d first put up elsewhere — they’re backdated roughly to when they were written.

On femme shame and feminist solidarity.

February 6, 2010

This has been my summer of femme: I’ve been fairly consistently made up, dressed up, and chatted up as a super girly supergirl. And I love that, I love playing princess and twirling my skirt and drinking tea with curled pinkie. I think I make it clear that it’s not all I do, but I do love it.

But I’ve met a fair few people through kink in the last several months, who’ve never known my history of more eclectic gender display, and with whom I haven’t really discussed politics at all — which might not sound so shocking but really it’d been years since I’d met any substantial number of people outside of activist circles, with whom I couldn’t readily assume certain values. Instead I’ve been trying to assume the best of people, and mostly I’ve been pleasantly surprised.

There have been instances where I’ve been uncomfortable, though, and realised that my arguments aren’t prepared for dominant culture, that I rely on the terrain of a particular discourse. When I launch my rhetoric leaps without this, they start shaky. Sometimes I don’t start at all — without a community to back up calling someone out, without recognising that as a specific cultural intervention and being able to call on all the strategies and wisdom that involves, it’s just too scary.

Being a young, thin, femme woman who fucks men means that men talk to you like you might agree with what they think of other women, who they think aren’t you but who you know may as well be you — who you will be, one day. It’s not enough to call yourself a feminist, to provide your alternative viewpoint somewhere further down the conversation. You can be horrified, but most likely your horror isn’t palpable, because that’s not what’s on his mind. You have to say it: This upsets me, this is unacceptable to me. But often I don’t.

It’s not just men, either — I’m no less devastated by women who deride all the ugly/old/fat/butch women on the scene. But either way it’s a feminist problem, because people rarely talk about men like their only worth is their fuckability. Not that men don’t have to grapple with that, but that there’s something outside it for them. And obviously (again again) I don’t have a problem with people having physical preferences, but there’s a difference between saying what you like and saying how you think other people should be.

[ Aside: I find it strange (and frankly, hilarious) that people assume that I’m only attracted to women who look like me, especially when those people are men trying to get into my bed. (If that theory holds, it won’t work for you, mister.) I have fucked people double my age, double my weight, a foot or more taller, and with hair in entirely different places. But also my femme identity depends on that being an option, not a requirement — if you take away the intentionality, you take away all my pleasure. ]

So maybe I should say here, because someone might read it: I will always, always take the side of the woman you scorn. I will always empathise with her, even if it seems we’re categorically different, because I know we’re serialised the same. Even if I’m silent, even if I sleep with you anyway, I will mourn the moment later, and feel ashamed.

On squirting, small breasts, and how this isn’t a pipe.

January 31, 2010

A few days ago there was this furore in the blogosphere over whether the Australian Classification Board had banned female ejaculation and small breasts. People justifiably understood this as problematising certain bodies and certain desires, and took issue.

Upon further investigation, it appears there hasn’t actually been any clear change to the Australian Classification Board’s guidelines or code, but that:

a) the guidelines don’t specify female ejaculation, but golden showers are refused classification and the Board has not responded to questions on whether they make the distinction between female ejaculation and urination - resulting, the Eros Foundation claims, in banning depictions of female ejaculation where the ejaculate lands on someone’s body or mouth.

b) the code refuses classification to any material that describes or depicts a person who is or appears to be a child under 18 - even, according to Fiona Patten, in some situations where the participants are proven to be over age. Nothing in the code specifies as to breast size but Patten claims that this was cited as a reason for one image to be refused classification, which has informed what the industry will import and publish in the future.

For those who don’t know me well, I’ll start by stating that I oppose both these bans — and most censorship, even of things I find abhorrent — but I want to talk about the values behind it a little more.

The first issue differs remarkably from the second in that the ban on golden showers is itself problematic. If your sexual politics is primarily founded on consent, even with the caveat that there are some things you can’t consent to, it’s pretty difficult to see how that would extend to golden showers. But any failure to distinguish between urination and female ejaculation is a massive oversight, in a culture that maintains a wilful misunderstanding of female bodies.

The second issue is an example of one of the most popular problems in censorship — the elision of the thing and the image of the thing. I think the response has been somewhat hyperbolic in that the publications Patten cites (titles like Barely Legal) market themselves on the appearance or approximation of adolescence. It may be unfair and unreasonable for breast size to be taken into consideration — and I think it is — but it’s also disingenuous to claim that it is incidental in the case of an image or publication that is selling childishness.

Of course, this is a labour issue as well, and for workers with small breasts in a market that often prefers the reverse, it may be in their interest to work that angle. Equal employment opportunity might not be the first issue that comes to mind here, but the interests of the workers are especially important when they’re appropriated for policies against workers’ interests, as they so often are in the sex industry.

But while I think breast size is an inept and offensive way to think about age boundaries, I don’t believe that resolving the issue of participant exploitation answers the questionability of certain images. It’s easy to conceive of a situation wherein a problematic image is produced without any exploitation of participants - and as animation becomes both more realistic and more popular, I hope it helps the two issues further disconnect. Does the right of adults to participate in various representations of their specific bodies trump the rights of all serialised others, to refuse such images space in their culture?1 Can I make child porn, because I’m not a child?2 Would it become ageplay porn, because I am an adult? Does it matter whether the viewer can tell the difference?

References:
- Somebody Think of the Children, Classification Board Responds
- Ms Naughty, Female Ejaculation Films to be Banned in Australia
- Sydney Morning Herald, Weird Politics of Small Boobs and Bodily Fluids

1. I’m talking about a much broader issue of non-consent, I think, though any question of children incites more panic and vitriol: eg sexualised rape in films that supposedly have some moral resolution (where I think the visual meaning and the stated meaning often differ), and BDSM scenes of "consensual non-consent" (where I guess the meaning for the viewer depends on how much you can see of that context of consent).

2. Obviously I think it’s fine for people who might look young to make porn where their presented age isn’t the focus. Personally I think that student/cheerleader/Catholic schoolgirl/etc dynamics are fine too as it’s age-ambiguous roleplay. I’m talking about when someone is made to look like a child. I want to think about this more though, especially in relation to ageplay and parent/child roleplays — message me if you’d prefer to discuss it elsewhere.

On eating meat, and politics versus ethics.

December 27, 2009
Indirectly inspired by this (linked by Claire) and some thing Liz linked a while ago about vegetarianism and eating disorders.

I started being vegetarian, ostensibly for environmental reasons.0 I’m not vegetarian any more. I avoid meat, like I avoid buying things with excess packaging or riding around in cars - that is, I still partake in it fairly often. I certainly don’t worry about gelatine or rennet. Seeing people count calories and carbs every day has made me never want to read the back of a label again. I’m sure it’s fine for some people, and the motivation makes all the difference — whether it’s ethics, religion, allergies, weight loss or other reasons. But even though it was based on ethics, I found my vegetarianism embodied the same values and practices that I associate with eating disorders: Purity. Discipline. Guilt. Bargaining: Drinking soy milk for a week will make up for noodles with fish stock. Counting: It’s been two months since that beef pho.

It’s been over ten years since my last confession. And maybe I could do with more discipline, more purity. Maybe I’ve revelled in chaos, dirt and sin a little too much since I stopped being Catholic. Perhaps it’s my attitude to anxiety that’s the problem, and I should appreciate being stopped in my tracks before a potentially important decision. I know sometimes I deserve to feel bad.

But I’ve also stopped believing that everything matters. Sure, the personal is political. That doesn’t make everything revolutionary. It definitely shouldn’t make it publicly accountable. (It’s a topic for another discussion, but I hate how radical politics can shrink your sovereignty1 to your physical skin. I need more space than that and I can’t negotiate bodily agency without that space, maybe not a room of my own but at least a minute to myself and a fistful of secrets.)

Sometimes, every little bit counts. Certainly, the body count. Maybe every styrofoam cup, every minute of a coal power station’s operation. Maybe not. For me this is the difference between the spiritual, the ethical, and the political. They often overlap but they’re not collapsible.

Spiritually, every instance matters. Every sin is on that scale, in your unbeating heart, hoping to float so the feather will be heavier. Maybe there’s atonement, redemption, forgiveness. But nothing is subtracted. The fall is constant and cumulative.2 Obviously this makes sense for meat-is-murder vegetarianism, but it’s compatible with any practice that includes dimensions of sacred and sinful - whether it’s using "womyn" and not "bitch", or buying fair-trade and boycotting Coca-Cola.

Ethics is in the middle. Maybe you bargain with yourself. If you have a utilitarian approach, maybe you do some more maths. And your criteria will change. But things are still basically ethical or unethical.

In politics, majorities matter. Having a critical mass matters. And it’s possible for a difference to be negligible. We’re talking about seismic structural shifts. Entire societies and cultures. The mathematics is at its core — naively, people * power * desire + x = change, with x being some combination of creativity, timeliness, strategy, system-vulnerability-scouting-skill, etc. Everything you do contributes, perhaps, but it’s not cumulative. Things reverse. Or stand still. It doesn’t matter, politically, whether you’re a customer of Safeway, Starbucks or Microsoft as long as they’re turning a growing profit.

I used to think ethics and politics were more or less the same thing — politics as collectivised ethics. But collectivising something changes its nature entirely. And for a long time I had so many conversations trying to convince people that they were already political that I just kept broadening the term. Now I’m pretty sick of the proliferation and profanation of politics, seeping into every thought, practice and field. I’ve been rethinking a lot of my behaviours as ethically rather than politically motivated, and enjoying their spiritual value. When I want to eat meat, and don’t, I feel pained, pure, hungry, potent, and foolish. Heady with the moral high that’s always accentuated by a bit of masochism and denial. And that exquisite feeling, that tenderness, of not getting what I want.

 
0. Really it was social and practical.
1. Maybe by sovereignty I mean privacy.
2. Okay, that last bit was too specifically Christian, and where there’s reincarnation it’s a bit different, but I think the distinction holds that spiritually everything you do matters.

On affinity.

December 2, 2009

I don’t enjoy being fetishised for my race. I generally don’t enjoy being racialised at all. But I get it if you like straight black hair and smooth bodies — that’s alright, I have certain preferences around physical attributes too; probably everyone does to some extent.

I’m much more put off by those who fetishise "Asian culture" and assume that will connect with me. I’ve lived in Melbourne since I was four. My intellectual inheritance is very much Western. I’m not westernised. Culture is never native, but Australian culture (including Asian Australian culture) is naturalised to me. My aesthetic, moral, political and intellectual values, as some kind of critical theory grrrl punk or whatever, spring from and struggle within a Western genealogy. Not that there’s nothing similar within various Asian cultures, or that similar strands there are necessarily imported. But when I say counter-culture, it’s counter to the dominant culture in my life.

My family has been through the Cultural Revolution followed by transnational migration, so I’m pretty aware that even the cultural practices I think of as Chinese are often unique to my family. Migrants from any country adapt their traditions to their new context. Besides which, culture is rapidly evolving in China itself too, as it is everywhere in the world.

When I first started identifying as a person of colour, I was so struck by the depth of my affinity with my new-found peers, I forgot for a moment how that affinity was constructed — as a very specific, strategic, deliberate political project. As Iris Marion Young might put it, we were a group that arose through a common intention in relation to our serialised condition - but the series itself is not already a group.

I’ve had friends and lovers from different backgrounds, and there’s no rule for what makes a strong connection. Two people may have "a lot in common" in terms of experiences, but it’s how we understand and respond to those experiences that creates affinity. Some of the most extreme instances of cultural dissonance I’ve experienced have been with people who have a very similar background. The fissure between our identities and thoughts was so much more dramatic from having been produced out of such like experiences, the same trajectory suddenly diverged. And there are people I’m really close to because we’ve been through a lot of the same shit. We have this camaraderie which is so precious to me. It’s precious because it’s rare, and it’s rare because it’s a potent mix of similarity and solidarity — of experience and desire. The intersection of culture and subculture, seriality and intentionality is what positions me as a queer POC feminist, rather than a pansexual Asian woman, or a radical democrat.

For others, overlaying culture/subculture on seriality/intentionality won’t be appropriate. Many subcultures are founded around aesthetics, and people won’t consider their moral and political desires as situated in or in any way related to their subculture. While I can identify the former independently of the latter, and certainly it’s refreshing to speak to those with similar values who are outside these subcultures, my own subculture is very much a community of political intentionality, and I think locating my values within it helps keep them fresh and fighting. I’ve been grappling with a lot of subcultural resentment lately, but I have a lot of appreciation too. Behind the bandannas, black jeans, faux-hawks and glitter, sometimes there is some real serious support and solidarity.

On Post-Activism.

October 29, 2009

So I was thinking about why I’m not going to Reclaim the Night tonight.

And there’s a bunch of fairly decent reasons: I’ve never been clear on the purpose of the event, more so than for other actions because there’s no policy goal. If the goal is to raise awareness of violence against women, I think it achieves that — within a small community perhaps, but deeply if temporarily. If the goal is to lessen such violence, the impact would be indirect and impossible to measure. If the goal is to strengthen women and feminist sisterhood, I think it succeeds there also. And maybe the answer is all those things, but I’m frustrated with purposes that allow no measure of failure or success.

I would like to know what I’m asking for, and from whom. I would like to imagine and articulate how feminism could engage with known perpetrators of violence, and I’d like to acknowledge that we all have the capacity for violence, while remaining conscious of its gendered dynamics.

I think the name "Reclaim the Night" recalls a tradition I want to respect and uphold on one hand (just because feminist history is precious to me) and radically renew on the other. Here I share a friend’s anxiety at whether it’s ever appropriate for non-Aboriginal Australians to claim space in this manner. I remembering hearing a young non-Indigenous activist calmly disregard an Indigenous activist’s dissent at an RTS during G20 2006 and continue ‘reclaiming’ the streets.

Reclaim the Night has also been anti-trans, and anti-sex worker, in a violent manner. Also I think the name places improper emphasis on violence in the streets, reinforcing the myth that women are most at risk in public space with mysterious strangers, not in their homes, or on the streets but at the hands of police, or in a detention centre, or a psychiatry ward …

I wonder if focusing on sexual violence helps to reveal the gendered aspects, or individualises experiences of violence and obscures intersections. Current definitions of intimate partner violence now incorporate many forms of abuse beside the physical and sexual, such as financial abuse — would broadening the understanding of violence complicate the issues in a way that is necessary or unproductive? If a definition of violence becomes so general as to refer simply to domination, does that just collapse the conversation? Or is consideration of a wider context of power relations inevitable, and integral to a better understanding of what sustains violence?

I want to think outside feminist tradition to explore whether different forms of violence can be thought of together, fought together, or if we need to suffer again through being torn apart. But I don’t want to abstract concepts beyond what is possible either — even if I have already. It does matter that I want what is immediately enact-able, even if I dream on.

*

But really I’m not sure why I feel compelled to defend my absence, especially given that I think it would be more a show for my friends and "community" than anything with wider impact. More than anything else my absence is because I’m lazy, and because I’m in imminent-academic-doom mode, where I can’t seem to do anything except sitting around in my pyjamas worrying about overdue essays, least of all write them.

Loki reminded me that I’m not an activist anymore, and haven’t been for a while. I seem to have trouble letting go of the label, as much as I started to hate it as soon as I won it. There’s just nothing to replace it though, nothing that says "these things concern me", without the awful arrogance of -conscious or -aware. But I’m really not an activist, now, certainly not as an occupation, not even as an identity if it means sustaining genuine hope in the future. It didn’t used to matter, really, to fail. Now I’m not sure it matters to try. Burn-out is a kinder term for it, but really it’s just faithlessness, a lack of stamina coupled with the most caustic pessimism, parading as apathy. Between drinks, these things still concern me. But I can’t separate this anxiety from a more general one, and I can’t have my politics pathologised. They’re still precious, I guess. But maybe something like a memory.

Right to choose, part two.

November 3, 2008

I thought of a hypothetical that either supports or complicates my earlier contention, that a woman decides if her pregnancy constitutes new human life, with its attendant rights, or something lesser.

A couple of weeks ago I was on a tram when I saw a man pushing a double pram, with twin toddlers inside. My immediate response was "oh god, imagine having twins". Then I wondered why the idea of aborting one of two twin foetuses (foeti?) seemed unnerving to me, even abhorrent. Upon quizzing several (pro-choice) friends I found most people had a similar response. Even though we could think of a number of reasons why a woman might not want twins, consistent with reasons why someone would not want a child at all (such as feeling mentally, physically or financially incapable), there was just something squicky about it, even when I specified that it wasn’t about choosing one foetus over another, that the hypothetical abortion would be random and was to be performed on identical twins with no differences as yet discernable. So while connotations with genetic engineering might contribute to the discomfort people felt, it couldn’t be the sole reason.

One friend suggested that perhaps abortion was justified as a choice between either having children, or not, while in this hypothetical case it was turned into a choice between two equally viable pregnancies, even if that wasn’t the woman’s motivation. Yet, in many cases the decision to continue a pregnancy is one between two children, albeit deferred and distanced in time — the decision to have an abortion is not about not having children but not having children here and now. Many women who have abortions go on to have children, or have had children previously, and if a woman plans to have a family of a certain size, in some way that makes the decision to continue a pregnancy a choice between one foetus and another, even if the other exists only as a concept, a possibility. If you only want one child, and feel overwhelmed and terrified at the thought of two, then why does aborting both foetuses and having (presumably) a single child later seem more acceptable than aborting one?

I think at least partly it’s to do with the idea that a woman either decides that her pregnancy constitutes life, or not. It’s silly to assume that a pregnant woman who intends to take the pregnancy to term sees the foetus as a human child, not simply the possibility of one, the promise of one, but it seems like a common view. And if the foetus is a person, it’s absolutely a person, because in most systems of morality, personhood is sacred, absolute, and powerful. Utilitarianism is frightening to theists and humanists alike because it challenges that belief, substitutes sacred life and absolute rights with negotiable and calculable preferences and needs. It can’t be one of two. It’s all or nothing.

 

 

 

 

The right to choose.

October 17, 2008
A couple of weeks ago I attended a pro-choice rally in the city. I’m pretty bored of rallies these days, and generally feel they don’t achieve much, but for this issue I felt it was essential to have a strong public presence because the anti-choice brigade have really been making themselves seen and heard, and pregnant women considering terminations need to feel that they have support behind whatever decision they make.

So it was your usual lefty rent-a-crowd — lots of socialists of various affiliations, a couple of ratbag anarchists, and your motley crew of others. I was surprised to find very few feminists from the university networks I’m aware of in the crowd, but I got the feeling that the action had largely been publicised among socialist networks without much involvement from campus women’s groups so maybe that makes sense.

Anyway, one of the chants I found amusing but somewhat curious went like this:

    An egg is not a chicken, a seed is not a try, a foetus ain’t a baby, so don’t lay that on me!

And I guess I more or less agree with that. But not entirely. I’ve always found the abortion debate interesting because it’s a real train track argument — for one side it’s about choice, and for the other it’s about life. I don’t think the anti-choice side is necessarily wrong, because if you believe that a foetus is a baby (and what would settle that, either way?) then it follows that killing it is wrong, regardless of its dependence on its mother — after all most people would find infanticide unacceptable in all situations, even if there are circumstances which would complicate the morality (eg, if the mother’s life is in danger, if the pregnancy is the result of rape, etc). I mean, I’d guess that most proponents of safe and accessible abortion prioritise the mother’s choice over the foetus’ life, but generally people aren’t willing to engage with those terms of debate, and for good strategic reason. But still that doesn’t answer the question of when life begins, whether or not that matters.

I think what I believe is that it’s up to the individual. And that’s a contentious, complicated argument, almost impossible to defend in a political arena where all arguments must be reduced to slogans. The sides are split so conversations are impossible, except perhaps between individuals; collectively the field of action is reduced to banners and war-cries. But honestly, I think during any stage of pregnancy, a woman decides what the thing in her womb is, if and when she’s become a mother.

Because I think abortion would be murder, if it were without the consent of the woman in whose body it takes place. And I think that the argument "it’s not a life" can be dangerous for reproductive rights, too, used against women who society doesn’t believe to be fit mothers. I think feminists, at least real feminists who are for the choices of all women, even those we might not make ourselves, need to be conscious of that. When a young, poor, single woman exercises her right to choose, and chooses to take her pregnancy to term, the normalisation of abortion as not only acceptable but prudent practice can and will be used against her. A father unwilling to pay child support, or a rich entrepreneur arguing against welfare and for "opportunity", will shut her up smugly saying "you chose".

And even if feminists support all these choices, we have to know our words will be used against us, our choices will be used against us. So what does it mean to have the right to choose? When we still suffer the consequences of our choices. I think what constitutes choice for me is where all you would endure is your own regret, not the punishment of others who weren’t there, didn’t know, and can’t understand.